I like this post a lot, and it touches on a number of topics I've been thinking about for a couple of pieces I'm working on.
This, to me, is vital: "ideology exists in multiple, simultaneous, seemingly contradictory modes—fluid and fixed, theoretical and practical, comprehensive and casual." I like it because it reflects the reality that we can try all we like to define things in one specific way or another — and it's natural to, working in social-scientific settings — but there are also common uses of a term as potent as "ideology" that won't fit this or that technical definition (and might not even be particularly about extremism).
Thank you also for pointing to the Barnett article. Looks like plenty of good material to explore. The developmental aspect there makes me think of the social-psychology research that points to deep-seated competing values (e.g. adherence to rules versus charitable treatment of everyone) that seem to underlie people's political ideologies.
And this is a gem: "Futilely, they long for that unrecoverable innocence, the uncritical acceptance of an ideology that purely validates the rightness and goodness of their in-group, and thus of themselves."
One of my big interests is the connection of (group) ideology with (individual) identity. My view fits what you describe here: individuals need to believe in something timelessly correct and pure about *themselves*, which exists in a mutually reinforcing relationship with the timeless purity and correctness of what's believed by their *group*, whether neo-Nazis, birdwatchers, Rotarians, Dallas Cowboys fans, Mormons, or whatever.
To my mind, this is simply the other side of the coin which says "that the social construction of reality is derived from in-group consensus." My group is right — both correct and upstanding — so that makes me right, too. Concomitantly, my group's views couldn't be wrong (incorrect, corrupt), or else I'd be wrong, too.
It's a powerful elixir of belief, and not only for extremists.
". . . individuals need to believe in something timelessly correct and pure about *themselves*, which exists in a mutually reinforcing relationship with the timeless purity and correctness of what's believed by their *group*, whether neo-Nazis, birdwatchers, Rotarians, Dallas Cowboys fans, Mormons, or whatever."
I think it's true that the relationship between sense of identity and self-alignment with groups is important for most--perhaps all--of us, although I wouldn't want to rule out exceptions where that analysis may be attenuated beyond usefulness (Ted Kaczynski might be an example). But I'd avoid putting it categorically. I think many/most of us don't idealize groups we belong to or fully invest our identities in any single group. I think there have been many Rotarians who've thought, "Boy, a lot of the guys at the lodge are idiots!" and continued to do their Rotarian best. I knew Yankee fans in days past who understood perfectly well why Brooklyn fans thought they were jerks for loving a team with a corporate ethos, but they couldn't stop loving the Yankees nevertheless (not that I sympathized). We don't have to be stupid and blind to feel strong allegiance to a group: there are degrees and styles of membership identity. You can be a patriot without being a yahoo.
Moreover, although the phrase can be used casually, I think the idea of the social construction of reality operates on levels more fundamental than ideology or even identity. The grammars of speech and action that an individual encounters in a natal family/community environment shape perception of material and social environments at the root, before anything as complex as ideology, in/out-group, or even correct/incorrect are grasped. The only way to avoid "indoctrination" is to be raised in silent isolation. And, again, I think there are countless examples of individuals critiquing--often publicly--a group they deeply align with or unexamined assumptions of that group that contact with other cultures has exposed. I don't think you're leaving room for that when you picture every person as needing to believe in the timeless perfection of their primary affinity group and themselves. (I expect no one reading this blog actually fits that description.)
Human beings are communal, and there are plenty of studies suggesting that social detachment/fragmentation is a widespread psycho-social problem and one driver of extremism, because it may create heightened need for deep engagement in identitarian-style organizations. The question for counter-extremism, I think, is identifying the pathologies that turn historically constructive forms of identification with a local, ethnic, religious, civic, or recreational group into toxic patterns. Most people who are socially embedded in a range of such group structures don't become extremists in action (or usually in thought). There may be neo-Nazi birdwatchers, but it makes sense to say that birdwatching is generally healthy and joining a neo-Nazi group is not.
Having written quite a bit about in-group critique, I would just add that for fringe extremists, the quest is to restore the in-group itself to a state of purity/innocence, to make it something the extremist ideologue can be proud of. There are lots of really interesting differences between fringe and mainstream/dominant extremist movements. When the movement is dominant, you tend to see the presumption of innocence on behalf of the in-group and the shared experience of personal innocence by being part of the in-group. For instance, when the ideology of racial slavery was being contested in the U.S., you saw very little in-group critique. Identity construction focused on buttressing the innocence of the in-group, but you didn't see stuff like in Siege, where the corruption of White people is the primary crisis.
Good point. But can a group be both "mainstream" and extremist? I'm not sure you can call antebellum southern whites extremist. Their identifying practice was traditionally acceptable enough to be built into the US Constitution. Abolitionism was a new radicalism, and John Brown was the signature violent extremist (a tension for us now, since anyone reading this blog likely sees Brown as an ethical model, even if a problematic one). Germany in the late 1930s would be a different example, because Nazi ideology had become dominant as an ideological innovation and was asserting new power in its intolerance, unlike slaveholders, who were protecting old power. Maybe dominant and mainstream are usefully distinguished.
Perhaps any time you have a dominant in-group it's hard to assess the range of internal dynamics because conformist pressure will inhibit expression of critical views that would show less alignment of personal identity and ideology than might be apparent. Psychological aspects discussed in your post would be complicated by issues of material and social self-interest.
As for Siege, assuming you mean Mason's book (which I've never read), it seems to me that a different analysis pertains to individuals who take on roles as founder or ideological innovator in extremist groups. They are, to borrow your terminology, carving out a new in-group from the larger eligible in-group, which may be different from shaping one's identity by aligning with an existing in-group.
my interest as well (“big interests is the connection of (group) ideology with (individual) identity”) looking forward to your writing (beyond testing phase lol) i too appreciated Berger’s pointing to Barnett articles so this to be on my reading list
Thanks! My goal in almost everything I write is to provide tools for other people to write, so I am glad to introduce this (weirdly undercited) paper to folks, among other things...
I think this is a very good post. Connections between family "ideology" and adult extremism are surely important to understand.
I appreciate that you frame the post as an initial attempt. I'm not sure how far generalizations will prove valid (which is why I like your tentative tone). I think there would need to be a range of models explaining varied etiologies. Some accounts by individual "formers" seem to involve early childhoods where family absence or dysfunction seems to have involved no coherent family ideology, while others seem to have mirrored clear family orientations. Protecting one's in-group / recapturing the purity of one's in-group / finding one's initial in-group and other formulas may all be in play to different degrees.
It would be a huge research project to work from cases towards typologies, but without that kind of empirical data I wonder whether we can get much past the tentative stage.
There are likely ways to approach it, ethnographically at least. I've been working through some early childhood development lit, but I have a lot of irons in the fire, so it's slow going.
I like this post a lot, and it touches on a number of topics I've been thinking about for a couple of pieces I'm working on.
This, to me, is vital: "ideology exists in multiple, simultaneous, seemingly contradictory modes—fluid and fixed, theoretical and practical, comprehensive and casual." I like it because it reflects the reality that we can try all we like to define things in one specific way or another — and it's natural to, working in social-scientific settings — but there are also common uses of a term as potent as "ideology" that won't fit this or that technical definition (and might not even be particularly about extremism).
Thank you also for pointing to the Barnett article. Looks like plenty of good material to explore. The developmental aspect there makes me think of the social-psychology research that points to deep-seated competing values (e.g. adherence to rules versus charitable treatment of everyone) that seem to underlie people's political ideologies.
And this is a gem: "Futilely, they long for that unrecoverable innocence, the uncritical acceptance of an ideology that purely validates the rightness and goodness of their in-group, and thus of themselves."
One of my big interests is the connection of (group) ideology with (individual) identity. My view fits what you describe here: individuals need to believe in something timelessly correct and pure about *themselves*, which exists in a mutually reinforcing relationship with the timeless purity and correctness of what's believed by their *group*, whether neo-Nazis, birdwatchers, Rotarians, Dallas Cowboys fans, Mormons, or whatever.
To my mind, this is simply the other side of the coin which says "that the social construction of reality is derived from in-group consensus." My group is right — both correct and upstanding — so that makes me right, too. Concomitantly, my group's views couldn't be wrong (incorrect, corrupt), or else I'd be wrong, too.
It's a powerful elixir of belief, and not only for extremists.
". . . individuals need to believe in something timelessly correct and pure about *themselves*, which exists in a mutually reinforcing relationship with the timeless purity and correctness of what's believed by their *group*, whether neo-Nazis, birdwatchers, Rotarians, Dallas Cowboys fans, Mormons, or whatever."
I think it's true that the relationship between sense of identity and self-alignment with groups is important for most--perhaps all--of us, although I wouldn't want to rule out exceptions where that analysis may be attenuated beyond usefulness (Ted Kaczynski might be an example). But I'd avoid putting it categorically. I think many/most of us don't idealize groups we belong to or fully invest our identities in any single group. I think there have been many Rotarians who've thought, "Boy, a lot of the guys at the lodge are idiots!" and continued to do their Rotarian best. I knew Yankee fans in days past who understood perfectly well why Brooklyn fans thought they were jerks for loving a team with a corporate ethos, but they couldn't stop loving the Yankees nevertheless (not that I sympathized). We don't have to be stupid and blind to feel strong allegiance to a group: there are degrees and styles of membership identity. You can be a patriot without being a yahoo.
Moreover, although the phrase can be used casually, I think the idea of the social construction of reality operates on levels more fundamental than ideology or even identity. The grammars of speech and action that an individual encounters in a natal family/community environment shape perception of material and social environments at the root, before anything as complex as ideology, in/out-group, or even correct/incorrect are grasped. The only way to avoid "indoctrination" is to be raised in silent isolation. And, again, I think there are countless examples of individuals critiquing--often publicly--a group they deeply align with or unexamined assumptions of that group that contact with other cultures has exposed. I don't think you're leaving room for that when you picture every person as needing to believe in the timeless perfection of their primary affinity group and themselves. (I expect no one reading this blog actually fits that description.)
Human beings are communal, and there are plenty of studies suggesting that social detachment/fragmentation is a widespread psycho-social problem and one driver of extremism, because it may create heightened need for deep engagement in identitarian-style organizations. The question for counter-extremism, I think, is identifying the pathologies that turn historically constructive forms of identification with a local, ethnic, religious, civic, or recreational group into toxic patterns. Most people who are socially embedded in a range of such group structures don't become extremists in action (or usually in thought). There may be neo-Nazi birdwatchers, but it makes sense to say that birdwatching is generally healthy and joining a neo-Nazi group is not.
Having written quite a bit about in-group critique, I would just add that for fringe extremists, the quest is to restore the in-group itself to a state of purity/innocence, to make it something the extremist ideologue can be proud of. There are lots of really interesting differences between fringe and mainstream/dominant extremist movements. When the movement is dominant, you tend to see the presumption of innocence on behalf of the in-group and the shared experience of personal innocence by being part of the in-group. For instance, when the ideology of racial slavery was being contested in the U.S., you saw very little in-group critique. Identity construction focused on buttressing the innocence of the in-group, but you didn't see stuff like in Siege, where the corruption of White people is the primary crisis.
Good point. But can a group be both "mainstream" and extremist? I'm not sure you can call antebellum southern whites extremist. Their identifying practice was traditionally acceptable enough to be built into the US Constitution. Abolitionism was a new radicalism, and John Brown was the signature violent extremist (a tension for us now, since anyone reading this blog likely sees Brown as an ethical model, even if a problematic one). Germany in the late 1930s would be a different example, because Nazi ideology had become dominant as an ideological innovation and was asserting new power in its intolerance, unlike slaveholders, who were protecting old power. Maybe dominant and mainstream are usefully distinguished.
Perhaps any time you have a dominant in-group it's hard to assess the range of internal dynamics because conformist pressure will inhibit expression of critical views that would show less alignment of personal identity and ideology than might be apparent. Psychological aspects discussed in your post would be complicated by issues of material and social self-interest.
As for Siege, assuming you mean Mason's book (which I've never read), it seems to me that a different analysis pertains to individuals who take on roles as founder or ideological innovator in extremist groups. They are, to borrow your terminology, carving out a new in-group from the larger eligible in-group, which may be different from shaping one's identity by aligning with an existing in-group.
My next big paper will be making the robust case for slavery as extremism, so stay tuned.
my interest as well (“big interests is the connection of (group) ideology with (individual) identity”) looking forward to your writing (beyond testing phase lol) i too appreciated Berger’s pointing to Barnett articles so this to be on my reading list
Thanks! My goal in almost everything I write is to provide tools for other people to write, so I am glad to introduce this (weirdly undercited) paper to folks, among other things...
My favorite line: We need to use a wider aperture.
Loved that line!
I think this is a very good post. Connections between family "ideology" and adult extremism are surely important to understand.
I appreciate that you frame the post as an initial attempt. I'm not sure how far generalizations will prove valid (which is why I like your tentative tone). I think there would need to be a range of models explaining varied etiologies. Some accounts by individual "formers" seem to involve early childhoods where family absence or dysfunction seems to have involved no coherent family ideology, while others seem to have mirrored clear family orientations. Protecting one's in-group / recapturing the purity of one's in-group / finding one's initial in-group and other formulas may all be in play to different degrees.
It would be a huge research project to work from cases towards typologies, but without that kind of empirical data I wonder whether we can get much past the tentative stage.
There are likely ways to approach it, ethnographically at least. I've been working through some early childhood development lit, but I have a lot of irons in the fire, so it's slow going.