Fear and self-loathing
How extremists exploit psychological dynamics to provoke emotional responses
Why do people turn to extremism? It’s a question asked often, but almost never credibly answered, for good reason. It’s increasingly clear to me that radicalization and the adoption of extremist beliefs are part of a suite of psychological dynamics. From time to time, this newsletter will consider parts of the suite, which I expect to address more fully in my dissertation.
Keep in mind that posts here often depict my process of understanding and not my final word on the topic. Writing helps me organize what I learn, and this is still a work in progress, subject to later revision. All that being said…
Extremist ideologies seek to socialize a dynamic known as self-discrepancy. Although ideologues might not know the exact term, they understand the concept very well.
People feel unease when they are asked to reconcile incompatible beliefs, an issue that I will be exploring more in several contexts across future work. For now, we’re going to look at one specific context -- beliefs about oneself, and what happens when one holds incompatible beliefs about oneself.
Introduced by psychology scholar E. Tory Higgins, Self-Discrepancy Theory[i] interrogates the negative emotions that occur when people believe they are falling short of being all they could or should be. The theory examines incompatibility among three main cognitive constructs of the self:
The actual self, meaning the person you understand yourself to be.
The ideal self, meaning the person you want to be.
The “ought” self, meaning the person that other people want you to be.
If you’re lucky enough to find all three of these selves in perfect harmony, well, congratulations I guess. Most of the rest of us are familiar with the gaps between reality, desire and obligation.
These discrepancies manifest in different ways. When someone perceives a discrepancy between their actual and ideal selves, they tend to be depressed, demotivated, and despairing. When someone perceives a discrepancy between their ideal and ought selves, they tend to become agitated, anxious, fearful and threatened, often worried that negative consequences will result from their failure to meet external expectations.
While we certainly create these cognitions for ourselves, they are also unavoidably social. The actual self is identified through introspection, but also through dialogue with others, who may be able to point out behaviors or attributes that we cannot see ourselves. Similarly, our ideal selves are shaped in dialogue about our innate potential, or our collective potential as members of an in-group. And the ought self is almost exclusively social, the product of expectations placed on us by others, which are based on social rules and responsibilities that have been developed collectively over years, centuries or even millennia, such as those derived from religion.
As I have discussed before in more detail,[ii] fringe extremist ideologues and recruiters often engage in very detailed in-group critiques that complement these individual dynamics. To refresh your memory, or if you’re new to my work, I describe extremist ideologies and in-group critiques as including the following subdivisions:
Eligible in-group: The group to which an extremist movement belongs and to which it appeals for support. In the case of White supremacists, for instance, the eligible in-group generally means “White people.”
Extremist in-group: The specific movement to which an extremist ideologue belongs, for instance, the KKK or the Atomwaffen Division.
Ineligible in-group: Members of the in-group who, by their actions, risk assignment to an out-group. For White supremacists, this can include people who engage in interracial marriage or people who align with out-groups against an extremist in-group.
In-group critiques apply the three cognitive constructs of self to the in-group collective, and then typically re-individualize them to the reader. In many extremist in-group critiques, the three cognitive constructs are stacked in very particular ways.
Prototype: An idealized version of the in-group’s potential. The ideal in-group is usually framed in historical terms, suggesting that the ideal once existed and will exist again. The prototype is characterized mainly by its traits, and the extremist in-group is often depicted as being a substantial or complete realization of the ideal prototype. An extremist ideological text may personify the ideal traits in a historical, mythical, or hypothetical individual.
Nomotype:[iii] The in-group as a manifestation of conformity with supposed in-group rules and norms. The nomotype is characterized mainly by its behavior. The rules and norms described in an extremist ideology provide a blueprint for an individual to align themselves with the in-group prototype.
Menotype:[iv] A “realistic” version of the eligible in-group’s current situation and attributes, as understood by the person describing it. In an fringe extremist ideology (as opposed to a mainstreamed ideology), the eligible in-group is mainly described by its discrepancy with the in-group prototype and nomotype.
These three categorical types are collectivized versions of the cognitive constructions described in self-discrepancy theory—the prototype as the ideal, the menotype as the actual, and the nomotype as the “ought” self. For now, at least, I’m using these terms rather than ideal, actual, and ought to distinguish the concepts from individual psychology and to situate them more firmly in the realm of group narratives.
Fringe extremist movements—meaning movements that are a disempowered minority within their eligible in-groups—seek to exploit self-discrepancy by stacking the types procedurally.
An ideology articulates the discrepancy between the menotype (actual) and the prototype (ideal), provoking despondency. Rather than allowing the reader to sink into despair, however, the ideology quickly introduces the nomotype (ought), psychologically prompting agitation and guilt but framing these feelings prescriptively. By complying with the clearly articulated expectations of the nomotype (for instance, by taking up arms), readers can align themselves with the prototype and cure their negative affect.
The nomotypical recommendations are usually a mix of self-regulatory behavior (dress codes, sexual practice, etc.) and hostile action against an out-group (“joining the caravan” and fighting the out-group rather than being “one who sits back”).[v]
In a future installment of this newsletter, I will look more deeply at exactly how this works, likely with reference to Higgins’ follow-on work addressing how these insights inform decision-making processes.
[i] Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: a theory relating self and affect. Psychological review, 94(3), 319. For a less academic (but still pretty academic) explanation, see https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-fundamental-four/201307/promote-prevent-be-congruent-or-discrepant
[ii] Berger, J.M. A Paler Shade of White: Identity & In-group Critique in James Mason’s Siege. Washington, D.C.: RESOLVE Network, 2021. https://doi.org/10.37805/remve2021.1.
[iii] Another rather loose coinage, from the Greek for “law.”
[iv] I am coining this (rather loosely) from an ancient Greek word used in the New Testament to refer to a state of “remaining as one, and not becoming another.”
[v] Berger, Paler Shade of White. Op. cit.
Wow, these are really helpful, powerful insights. Thank you.
The interplay between actual, ideal and ought self conjure for me notions of romantic partners and intimate relationships. And I guess this sort of cult extremist influence works by hijacking/hacking similar dynamics and social pressures. We all want to be loved and to fit in, of course.
Wanted to share a lovely piece of art that speaks to similar ideas - how our ‘stars’ re-arrange as we move through relationships and reconcile idealized versions of each other with reality. The Divine Chord by the Avalanches: https://youtu.be/TvZpn322LxE
Great explanation on the interplay between terrorism and psychology. Thanks.